
















Much contemporary work in the anthropology of religion explores how human experience of the divine is mediated.  One question rarely asked, however, is why people distance the divine from themselves in the first place, such that complex practices of mediation are necessary to make it present.  I read Hubert and Mauss’ Sacrifice as a key precursor to current work on religious mediation that answers this question by focusing on how religious mediations model and shape social ones.  Examining a shift from sacrifice to possession as forms of mediation among Pentecostal converts in Papua New Guinea, the usefulness of this approach to religious mediation is demonstrated and its links to broader issues in anthropological theory are explored.
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“At best, ‘communication’ is the name for those practices that compensate for the fact that we can never be each other” (Peters 1999:268).

	Over the last fifteen years, one of the most important trends in the anthropology of religion has been a turn to focusing on the various ways the distance between the divine and the earthly is mediated.  This can be seen in the work of such currently influential scholars as Webb Keane, Birgit Meyer, and Matthew Engelke.  For example, lLaying out the idea at the heart of this trend in particularly clear terms, Meyer (Meyer 2006: 434) suggests that religion should be “approached as a practice of mediation between people and the divine (or more broadly: the realm beyond the empirically perceivable).” For Keane (1997: 48), who sStartsing from a similar assumption, Keane (1997: 48) points to the ways religious mediation must accomplish tasks that social life does not put to more mundane forms of communication by making present beings that are not otherwise very obviously on the scene.  Picking up on a phrase used by Keane (1997: 51), Engelke (2007) posits what he calls This createsis a “problem of presence” (Keane (1997: 51), as which for Engelke (2007) is the key issue of religious mediation.  Since deities must in most cases be made present by mediators of one kind or another (e.g. words, material objects, embodied performances), religions per force have to grapple with how to define and evaluate various kinds of mediators and the various kinds of connections they forge between the human and the divine - they have to develop, that is to say, what Patrick Eisenlohr (2012: 46) calls “theologies of mediation.”  Taken together, the work of these three anthropologists and those influenced by them has demonstrated quite forcefully the value of approaching religion from the point of view of its quality as mediation.
	Keane, Meyer, and Engelke share a core conception of the nature of religion that undergirds their turn to the study of mediation.  In this conception, religion must take up issues of mediation and its role in shaping sociality because people almost never relate to deities face-to-face, nor do they take the face-to-face encounter to be a regulating idea in their relations with deities.  Deities, to put this point another way, are never simply there the way other people are there: they are generally further away than other people, and often, even if they maintain something approaching or even at times exceeding normal human proximity, they are not sensorially available in all the ways people are (e.g., sometimes in some cases they cannot be seen, or in others they cannot be heard, or touched etc.).  The problem of distance created by this noninhuman way of being present in turn sets up the problem of divine mediation: how are deities and people to maintain contact with one another and what kinds of contact are appropriate between them?  And, finally, how are humans to relate to the mediators that establish this contact (Meyer 2011)?
	Even as they have in common this basic understanding of the nature of religion, Keane, Meyer, and Engelke, even as they have in common this basic understanding of the nature of religion, take their investigations of religion as mediation in different directions.  Yet for all the diversity that marks their work, there is a question related to religious mediation that I take to be an obvious one but that I have not seen posed by them or by others: Why do people bother positing beings that are so problematically distant and distinct from themselves that they require unusual practices of mediation to realize and relate to?  Why P, put otherwisein a different way, why do people so often inhabit religious worlds that make mediation and issues of presence and absence such profound problems?  Presumably, people could construct religion differently if they wanted to.
	Cultural anthropologists do not these days typically ask the kind of “why” questions I just posed – grudgingly leaving them to fields like cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.  But I think I can provide something of an answer using familiar cultural anthropological tools.  In order to begin to do so, I turn to Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss’ (1964) 1898 essay on sacrifice.   Hubert and Mauss (1964: 97) define sacrifice precisely as a matter precisely of “communication” and “mediation,” and their essay, I want to suggest, can be seen as an ancestor to current work on religious mediation.  When it is read in this way, it can help us consider the question of why people might want to confront themselves with issues of mediation in the very emphatic fashion they so often do in religious contexts.	  
	Despite its tight focus on the rite of sacrifice, Hubert and Mauss’s essay must be read more generally as an original contribution to social thought more generally, and as an important anticipation of Durkheim’s (1995) great work on religion that followed about 15 years later.  Looked at in such terms, the essay ican be seen as first and foremost a striking treatise on the role of mediation not only in religion, but also in social life more generally.  For the primary theme of the essay, it will be recalled, is the necessity for people to establish a link between the sacred and the profane, while at the same time maintaining the distinction between them.  Contact between the sacred and the profane is crucial to all kinds of sacrifices undertaken to achieve all kinds of benefits,  they argue, but equally, all kinds of sacrifice must guard against the complete “fusion” of the sacred and the profane (Hubert and Mauss 1964: 11).   It is, they go on to assert, the mediation of the sacrificial victim that accomplishes the trick of establishing contact while avoiding fusion – by means of a victim that is distinct from the person who benefits from the sacrifice (the sacrifier), mediating bridges are built between the sacred and the profane, but they are also, oftengenerally quite literally, burnt, so that contact between them does not become a relationship of unmediated identity.​[1]​
	In the developing code of the Durkheimian school at the time that Hubert and Mauss wrote their essay, the claim that the sacred and profane should come into contact but not fuse with one another also meant that the individual (represented by the profane) and the social (represented by the sacred) should make contact, should take from one-another, but should not collapse into one another.  Because the victim mediates the link between them, the individual sacrifier “gives up something of himself but he does not give up himself” in his entirety in a complete identification with the social/sacred (Hubert and Mauss 1964: 100).  Social relations, Hubert and Mauss (1964: 102)  further arguego on to assert, have for people a character of “intimate penetration and separation, of immanence and transcendence” – they are part of people but not identical to them.  I think in the context of their argument we should read this as much as a normative statement about the ideal form of social relations as a purportedly descriptive one.  The discovery of their essay is that it is mediation that allows people to reach this normative goal: to connect with others without fusing with them.  And sacrifice presents to people the ideal workings of mediation in this sense in the clearest possible way. 
	For Hubert and Mauss, it is the genius of mediation as a social practice that it presupposes and reaffirms separation even as it accomplishes connection.  On Mauss’s account, all of social life, not only its religious dimension, requires such mediation if it is to work properly, as he would later show in The Gift (Mauss 2016)1990).  But if the human condition makes the operation of mediation quite universal in social life, it is also true that debates over the proper kinds of mediations between people and between people and society are a staple of political negotiation in all societies.  The claim this article will go on to make is that, as Engelke, Keane, and Meyer suggest, religion is a key arena in which to study how people take up matters of mediation, proximity, and distance that are at the heart of these debates.  Indeed, I will suggest that people often construct religious worlds in which mediation is so problematic precisely because such worlds provide them with an arena in which to work out these issues that are inescapably part of social life.
	It is perhaps not an accident that Keane, Meyer and Engelke all developed their important general theoretical views about the role of mediation in religious life out of extensive ethnographic experiences focused on the study of Christianity.  For as Keane (2007) and Engelke (2007) have both argued in detail, Christianity, particularly in its Protestant and Pentecostal-Charismatic forms, tends to downplay the importance of mediation between the divine and the human as much as possible, opting instead for models of routine divine distance sometimes punctuated by periods of direct, unmediated divine presence.  For Keane, this emphasis on the dangers of mediation shows itself in the hostility Dutch Calvinist missionaries to Sumba, Indonesia took toward all of the mediators – from sacrificial meat to fixed verbal prayers – that Sumbanese people used to approach their ancestors.  Christianity, as the missionaries saw it, and as many of their Sumbanese converts still see it today, is a religion that should forgo the use of all mediators in its approach to God.  The German Pietist missionaries whom Meyer (1999: 75) studied similarly attacked the material mediations the Ewe of Ghana used to make contact with their ancestors, focusing, for example, on condemning rites of sacrifice.  The charismatic Friday Masowe apostolics of Zimbabwe studied by Engelke (2007: 8) take the excoriation of material mediation to a further extreme, defining even the reading of the Christian Bible as an illegitimate dependence on mediation, insisting instead that people must experience the word of God “live and direct” in the midst of Holy Spirit filled practices of worship.
	In developing an answer to the question of why people construe their divinities in such a way as to make the mediation of their presence a fraught issue, I draw on my own ethnography with another Christian group: the Charismatic Christian Urapmin of Papua New Guinea.  Like Sumbanese Christians, the Ewe, and the Friday Masowe apostolics, the Urapmin have also found that conversion to Christianity has left them with unsettled issues of about the proper nature and importance of religious mediation.  For the Urapmin, as for Sumbanese Christians and the Ewe in particular, these problems crystallize around rituals of sacrifice, which they Urapmin understand Christianity to prohibit.  But among the Urapmin, Christianity has also brought with it new kinds of rites – those of possession by the Holy Spirit.  There is no analogue of any kind of spirit possession in traditional Urapmin religion (Robbins 2004: 131), and this brings to the fore the extent to which new Christian forms of possession contrast with traditional Urapmin rites of sacrifice when it comes to issues of religious mediation.  In fact, at least in Urapmin if not in other places as well, one can see possession as a rite that as regards issues of mediation is the inverse of sacrifice.  If sacrifice insists on distance between the sacred and the profane and is built around the mediating role played by the victim, possession represents a sort of degree-zero of both distance and mediation and it does not feature any mediator that plays the role the victim plays in sacrifice: in possession, the space between the deity and the person collapses and co-presence replaces mediated contact.  Given that these two rites handle mediation in such distinct ways, a comparative study of them should introduce us to a range of positions people can take on its proper practice.   The Urapmin material helps to expand this point.
	

Sacrifice and Distance in Urapmin Indigenous Religion and Social Life
	In this section, I want to show the ways in which Ttraditional Urapmin religion was focused on sacrifice and on creating distance between the sacred and the profane.  I will also claim that Iin doing so, Urapmin religionit modeled and legitimated a general Urapmin emphasis on the distances that separated people from one another.​[2]​ 
	To provide a background for these points, it is useful to present some basic ethnographic information on the Urapmin and their conversion to charismatic Christianity.  A rural society of about 390 people living, the Urapmin are one of the Min or Mountain Ok groups that populate the far Mountainous areas of the West Sepik (Sandaun) and Western Provinces of Papua New Guinea.  The Urapmin were never directly missionized by Westerners.  In the 1960s, the elders sent young men out to study with Baptist missionaries living with nearby groups and these men, upon completing their studies, brought the gospel back to Urapmin and began to teach it to those who had remained at home.  Then, in the late 1970s, a Charismatic Christian revival movement swept through much of Papua New Guinea.  When it reached Urapmin in 1977, it ignited a year-long period during which many members of the community were ‘kicked’ by the Holy Spirit (Spirit i kikim​[3]​) - becoming possessed as their bodies shook and they felt an overwhelming sense of their own sinfulness.​[4]​  Most Urapmin who were old enough to experience the revival say that it was having these experiences of possession (kisim Spirit, lit. “‘getting the spirit”’) or watching others have them that convinced them that God really existed and that the cosmological claims of Christianity were true.  Once the possessions began, people quickly started to convert and within a year Urapmin had become a completely Christian community marked by its devotion to a recognizably charismatic form of the faith.  People still point to the work of the Spirit among them today as a way of confirming the to them obvious validity of the Christian understanding of the world.  Hence possession has been and remains central to Urapmin Christianity.
	As the Urapmin understand it, one of the things their conversion to Christianity required of them was that they leave their old religion (alowol imi kukup, – lit. “‘the way of the ancestors”’) behind, and this is something they have largely succeeded in accomplishing.  The traditional religion the Urapmin discarded was less concerned with creating divine or even inter-human presence and proximity than it was with creating distance between people and between people and the divine.  The new anthropology of religious mediation, with it emphasis on studying how deities are made present, can obscure how much people sometimes invest in distancing themselves from their gods.  Such distancing can, in some times and places, be people’s most important religious project, which the new anthropology of religious mediation, with its emphasis on studying how deities are made present, runs the danger of obscuring.​[5]​  As Schmidt (2000: 6) has noted in his study of North American Christian approaches to the sense of hearing, “in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, divine absence, far more than presence, had to be constructed….”  Though for different reasons, Urapmin religion was similarly committed to the creation of divine distance.
	Traditional Urapmin religion created distance by means of two different kinds of sacrifice.  One kind was the sacrifice of marsupials to ancestors.  These sacrifices were , performed as part of men’s cult rituals designed to help boys grow into men and make crops grow well.  These were the most elaborate and important of traditional Urapmin rituals.  Represented only by their bones, the ancestors to whom these rituals were directed were distant presences, and while sacrifices sought the ancestors’ cooperation, nothing about these rituals suggested that they in any way aimed to make the ancestors present or bring them closer to human beings.  As Hubert and Mauss would suggest, these sacrifices both brought divine power into play in Urapmin life and ensured it would not occupy too much or too constant a space within it.
	The dynamic of sacrificial distancing is even more apparent in the other kind of sacrifice the Urapmin used to practice and, as I will discuss later, still sometimes hesitantly undertake.  This kind of sacrifice, known as kang anfukeleng (“‘pig sacrifice”’), is to the motobil, nature spirits who Urapmin once saw as the owners of all of the land and other natural resources they draw on in making their lives.  These spirits generally let people use the resources they owned, provided people followed taboos (awem) that required them to keep some distance from the spirits by talking only quietly when they gardened or hunted and refraining from laughing or in other ways potentially embarrassing the spirits when they were in the bush.  When people violated these rules, the spirits “‘grabbed”’ them with their arms and legs and refused to let go, thus rendering them ill.  When an illness lingered, people would seek out diviners who would tell them which spirit was causing it.  They would then sacrifice a pig, usually a younger one, to the spirit.  The afflicted person, the sacrifier, would hold a rope tied to one of the pig’s forelegs as the sacrificer pronounced spells commanding the spirit to take the pig and release the person.  The sacrifier would then release the rope and the pig would be held up by the rope in a bipedal position to be shot in the heart by the sacrificer.  The pig would then be cooked, its “smell” given to the spirit and its meat eaten by those in attendance.
	In its distancing dynamics, kKang anfukeleng is a classic sacrifice.  It is carried out to break to strong a link – a clutching, grabbing link – between the spirit world and the human one, and it does so by creating and then destroying a mediator between them.  It upholds a relational ideal of respectful distance against violations of this norm first by a human being (in his/her breach of rules of taboo) and then by a spirit (in its clutching grasp of its victim).
	Beyond sacrifice, another key aspect of traditional Urapmin religion also highlighted the dangers of mediation and the need to respect distance between people and the ancestors.  This was its pervasive emphasis on secrecy and on the unreliability of sacred knowledge as a mediator between the divine and human realms.  The Urapmin men’s cult had four major and a number of minor stages (ban) into which boys were inducted sequentially from their youth through as late as their young adulthood.  Although sacrifices to the ancestors were an important component of these rituals, their main focus was on the instruction of the novices.  At each initiation stage, initiators presented novices with important mythical and cosmological information and at the same time insisted to them that this information was secret (awem) and must be kept from women and younger men.  As the initiation stages progressed, however, the novices quickly came to realize that it was not only women and younger boys from whom secrets were kept.  At each new stage, the initiates were told that the information that was given to them at the last stage was “wrong” (famul) and was now being corrected, only to learn at the next stage that the corrected information was wrong as well.  By the end of the initiation sequence, what initiates learned most fully was that they could not have confidence in what they knew, and that keeping secrets, rather than learning and knowing the truth about the world, was the most important aspect of religious life.
	The secrecy and attendant skepticism that were at the center of the men’s cult served, like sacrifice, to create a gap between people and the ancestors – a gap that expressed itself in people’s sense that they did not really know all they should about the nature of the ancestors and what they wanted from men.  Even the oldest men, the one’swhom everyone thought of as most knowledgeable, would say they were not sure how the cosmos worked.  Even those closest to the sacred, that is to say, tended to emphasize the abyss of ignorance that separated them from it. (for Elders in neighboring societies would make comparable statements from elders elsewhere in the region(, see Barth 1975;  and Jorgensen 1981).
	At the same time that the men’s cult stressed the distance between people and the sacred, its emphasis on secrecy also served to create distances between people themselves, reminding us that themes of religious mediation engage social concerns as well as cosmological ones.  Among the Urapmin, as among other groups in their region, differences in legitimately possessed stocks of knowledge created recognized social differences.  In such a social system, to hold the same knowledge as someone was in important social respects to be identical with them, a state the emphasis on secrecy worked to prevent (see also Barth 1975, Jorgensen 1981).  By learning to withhold key religious knowledge from younger men and women, boys came to understand that one activity crucial to ensuring both the correct functioning of the world and the stability of their own mature masculine identities was that of maintaining their distinctiveness in relation to them by preventing linguistic mediation and the attendant transfer of knowledge from drawing them into identity with these social others.  Women, raised to believe they would be killed if they learned the men’s cult secrets, understood the importance of secrecy and interpersonal distance in these terms as well.  Beyond the focus on secrecy, the theme of difference and distance in relations between people showed up in other aspects of traditional Urapmin religious life as well.  It was there in beatings that initiators delivered to novices – treating them like distant enemies, rather than close kin one should ideally “‘hold”’ (kutalfugumin) in a different, less grasping sense than the nature spirits hold people.  It was there too in the elaborate system of food taboos that prevented commensality between many kinds of people in everyday life.  Just as traditional Urapmin religious mediation focused on marking and maintaining the space between the spiritual and the human world, so too did it work to emphasize the importance of distance in relations between people themselves.
	The idea that people should maintain some distance from one another was also a marked theme outside the religious domain, for it dominated the way people understood everyday communication.  Along with their religious emphasis on secrecy, the Urapmin subscribed to a view of language that held that it could never communicate what others thought or felt, and that stressed that because language could not convey this, people could never know what occupied the minds of their fellows.  This view of communication,  which I and others have referred to elsewhere as the assumption of the “opacity of other minds” (Rumsey and Robbins and Rumsey 2008), further entrenched the notion that distance between people was natural.  Even when secrets were not actively kept as part of religious practice, people never imagined they could come to identify with one another by thinking the same thoughts or knowing the same things (Robbins 2012).​[6]​
Given the traditional importance of sacrifice and secrecy in creating distance between persons and between persons and various sacred figures, it is noteworthy that in turning away from their traditional religion the Urapmin insist they have abandoned both sacrifice and secrecy.  Like other Christians, they say Jesus was the last sacrifice, and they never sacrifice to the ancestors and rarely and only reluctantly do so to the nature spirits (about which, again, more below).​[7]​  And religious secrecy, they claim, is also a thing of the past.  One of Christianity’s great virtues, as they see it, is that it no longer insists that cosmological knowledge be ‘hidden’ (bantap), but rather puts everything “‘in the open”’ (kem diim).
	Along with leading the Urapmin to set aside sacrifice and secrecy, Christianity has also encouraged them to struggle to find ways to move closer to one another in daily life by using language in ways to that reveals their thoughts and feelings to one other.  TAs I have documented elsewhere, they have found this requirement quite difficult to meet, though they do work toward doing so (Robbins 2001).  WIn the context of the present argument, what is important for present purposes is that we see the Urapmin Christian injunction that people learn to produce sincere speech that reveals to others what they are thinking and feeling is in keeping with their general Christian concern that converts abandon mediators that create distance and instead embrace relational techniques that focus on producing presence and closeness.  Nowhere is this more obvious than in the key role Urapmin Christianity gives to possession.
	
On the Complexities of Holy Spirit Possession in Urapmin
	In light of Hubert and Mauss’s analysis of sacrifice as providing an ideal model of processes of mediation between people and between people and the sacred, one has to ask how those Christians who have abandoned this rite come to think about the relationship between the sacred and profane realms and the ideal social relationships it models.  In many Protestant denominations, the difficulty of construing the relationship between the sacred and the profane in the absence of sacrifice has led people to treat them as forever kept apart.  In these forms of Christianity, as Donoghue (2001: 57) puts it, “the gap between human beings and God is absolute.” (  Donoghue 2001: 57). Or, as Engelke (2007:12) puts it in his argument for the centrality of the problem of presence for the Christian tradition, “Christianity is premised on an absolute difference” between the divine and the human realms.  But even as Donoghue and Engelke’s claims hold for Protestant Christianity quite widely, it is also crucial to notice, as Engelke and others stress, that this postulate of difference and distance has led many Protestants to become preoccupied with finding ways to make God present.  Pentecostals and Charismatics, in particular, have been successful in finding ways of accomplishing this.   By treating the Holy Spirit as a very active mediator between the divine and the human spheres, they have made interpenetration of the two realms possible.  This would seem quite neatly to solve the problem of how to get the two back into relationship in the absence of sacrifice.  But it does so only by virtue of its at least potential failure to keep the sacred and profane distinct, as the Holy Spirit comes to be present in all areas of life.  Indeed, it is this possibility of fusion that possession, with its aura of unmediated contact, always puts before people.  Must those who like the Urapmin give up sacrifice for possession also give up all hope of maintaining some distance from their gods?  If we look carefully at how Holy Spirit possession works in Urapmin, and among at least some other Pentecostals and Charismatics as well, we can see what kind of work gets done to insure thatto ensure that this is not the case. 
	Pentecostal ideas about the way Holy Spirit interacts with people are complex and quite varied both within and between communities.  This variation has not been much studied, though Samarin (1972:2) has noted that “the metaphors” Pentecostals use to describe divine-human contacts are “numerous” and he lists as examples those of being “possessed, guided, surrounded, or empowered by God” (Samarin 1972:4).  This diversity in folk terminology, at least when it exists in one community, as its does in Urapmin, needs to be understood not simply as a situation in which people deploy a number of different words to refer to the same thing, but rather as representing a genuine complexity in their conceptualization of possession – a complexity that bears examination for the way it turns on unsettled issues concerning the nature of divine mediation.
In exploring the complexity of Urapmin notions of possession, it would make sense to consider both the ways the Urapmin understand the relationship of the Holy Spirit to God, and the way they understand the relationship of the Holy Spirit to human beings.  In the interest of space, however, I will not dwell on the Holy Spirit/God relationship here, except to say that the Urapmin do see the Spirit as distinct from God in important respects distinct from God and thus as a mediator between God and human beings.  The rest of this section explores the issues of distance and identification that mark diverse Urapmin ideas about how the Spirit effects this mediation by relating to people.
Urapmin think about how the Spirit relates to people in at least four ways: 1)’ “strong believers”’ are guided by the Spirit or “‘have”’ the Spirit at all times; 2) the Spirit sometimes speaks explicitly to people in their hearts; 3) all kinds of people become dramatically possessed by the Spirit in possession dances known as “‘Spirit discos”’ (Spirit disko) aimed at removing sin from the body; and 4) there exist a class of ritual specialists known as Spirit women who are both possessed by the Holy Spirit and are shown images by it that allow them to view things that are normally unseen.  The Urapmin think of each of these kinds of Spirit-human relationship in somewhat different ways, construing issues of distance and mediation differently in each case.
	The idea that people who are firm believers can “‘have”’ the Spirit in their hearts, the seat of all thought, emotion, and will, or be guided by the Spirit, plays an important role in Urapmin thinking about human motivation and morality.  The Spirit causes people to “‘think good thoughts”’ in their hearts (gutpela tingting, aget fukunin tangbal), thoughts that help them overcome (daunim) the urgings of willful desires and destructive emotions such as anger.  The Spirit, as people say, helps them to “‘follow God’s will”’ rather than their own.  Yet one hears about the Spirit as a source of consistent moral direction most often in counter-factual or if-then statements made as part of moralizing discourses that are prevalent in contemporary Urapmin life (Robbins 2004).  Thus public speakers often proclaim that people must seek the Spirit’s guidance so that they can stop behaving badly, or that if they were to have the Spirit’s guidance, then they would not act so badly.  By contrast, one rarely hears people boasting that they consistently have the Spirit in their hearts as a guide, or claiming that others experience this.  Thus, although the image of Spiritual guidance, often figured as having the Spirit “‘inside one’s life”’ (insait long laip bilong en), suggests great intimacy between people and the Spirit, perhaps even near identity, the fact that people speak about having the Spirit in this way primarily in hypothetical constructions indicates that the experience of constant, enduring close contact with the Spirit is not one people tend to have.
	The relative rarity of such long termlong-term identifications between people and the Spirit contrasts with numerous cases in which people say the Spirit “‘spoke”’ to them or “‘spoke”’ to them “‘in their hearts’.”  People fairly often have recourse to such constructions when explaining how they make both important and mundane decisions.  When describing what it is like to have the Spirit speak to them, people consistently say that they do not hear a voice.  Instead, as is common in Pentecostal glosses on this idiom in many places in the world, they say they experience the Spirit’s speech as a sense of firm certainty in their decision to pursue a particular course of action.  Urapmin often feel ambivalent about choices they must make (a feeling that is frequently rooted in contradictions in their current cultural situation and that fuels their passion for moral discussion – see Robbins 2004), referring to it as a state of being of “‘two hearts”’ (aget alep).  One knows the Spirit has spoken when all traces of such ambivalence are gone.
Even if they do not hear the Spirit’s voice in audible terms, however, the Urapmin do consistently use idioms of speaking to describe this contact, and in doing so they suggest that in some sense they understand this kind of mediation as primarily verbal and therefore somewhat distanced.  It points more to establishing an ideal Christian linguistic relationship with the Spirit – knowing precisely what the Spirit means by its speech – than it does to the Spirit directing one’s life by entering one’s body as we might imagine it would in cases approaching classic models of possession and as is suggest by the notion of having the Spirit “‘inside one’s life”’ that people use when talking about the more enduring relationship of Spiritual guidance discussed above.  That a distance is preserved between the person and the Spirit in these cases is also attested to by the clear sense in which Urapmin who have been spoken to by the Spirit still take responsibility themselves for the carrying out the courses of action the Spirit suggests  - it is they, not the Spirit, who chooses and acts.  People come out of these encounters with the Spirit claiming to know their own hearts very clearly, rather than asserting that their wills have been overridden by that of the Spirit.
The image of heightened personal efficacy and control that accompanies hearing the Spirit’s voice contrasts quite starkly with those connected with the one other widely socially distributed form of possession I will discuss: that which takes place during the group possession dances known as Spirit discos.  GSpirit discos are rituals generally attended by the whole of a church congregation, t.  These ritualsy take place at night and begin, after a prayer, with men and women joining in a circular dance around the inside of the Church.  This dancing is understood as “‘pulling the Spirit”’ (pulim Spirit) down into the church.  As if to enact this pulling, many dancers repeatedly raise their arms aloft and then bring them down in a pulling motion.  As the dance goes on, often after a half hour or more, some dancers will become possessed.  They begin to shake and flail violently and for the rest of the evening others will stay with them and hold them in an effort to “‘control”’ them (kcontrolim) and keep them from hurting themselves or others.  During a successful Spirit disco, several people will become possessed in this way, and their intense careening about the church lends the dances a feel of near chaos and danger.  Dancers who get the Spirit often remain possessed for an hour or more, and the ritual goes on until all of them have collapsed in heaps on the floor.  In their post-possession state, they lie limp and radiant, an image of satiation and perfect repose that, I have argued elsewhere, represents to the Urapmin the paradigm of a person beyond human willfulness and the sins to which it leads (Robbins 2004).
How is the Spirit’s relation to people understood during Spirit discos?  People undertake these rituals after several weeks during which all of the members of the church have participated in private confession rites with a pastor or deacon and have “‘given”’ their sins to God.  If all have not confessed their sins, the Spirit will not come.  The Urapmin understand the violent movements of the possessed dancers to be caused by the Holy Spirit, which has entered their bodies and is fighting with their sins as it works to cast them out.  Urapmin often speak of sins in material terms, as if they are things that pile up within one’s body and make one “‘heavy”’ (hevi, ilum).  In confession, one gives them to God.  But in some sense that is not quite clearly spelled out, it remains for the Holy Spirit, during the Spirit disco, to definitively remove the physical residue of sin from the body.  We do not need to get further into Urapmin theology of sin and redemption here.  For present purposes, what is important is that
 Aas a form of possession, the contact that occurs between people and the Holy Spirit during the Spirit disco involves the Spirit entering into people’s bodies and taking over their behavior.  People report feeling “‘hot,”’ and “‘heavy,”’ and “‘sad”’ during Spirit disco possession, and to feeling a profound sense of their own sinfulness, but they do not report the Spirit communicating anything in particular to them or addressing their hearts.  For the duration of the possession, their bodies become the site of a struggle between the Spirit and sin in which they play no active part.  Mediation here comes close to identity as the possessed person’s sense of self is lost in the kind of depersonalized state of dissociation that psychologists and psychological anthropologists classically use to describe possession.  Distance between the sacred and the profane is at a minimum.  Furthermore, because a successful Spirit disco, defined as one in which at least a few people are possessed, indicates that the entire church community is free of sin, these rituals allow the divine to infuse earthly life quite broadly.  At the same time, however, this state of spiritual infusion is fleeting.  As Urapmin see it, once the ritual is over, people quickly begin to sin again and life rapidly reverts to its mundane state, which is why new rounds of confession and Spirit disco performance will be called for in the future.
The final way in which people and the Spirit come together occurs between the ritual specialists known as Spirit women and the Holy Spirit.  It is appropriate to discuss this one last because it is the most restricted – the others are in principle open to everyone, but this one is not – and because it contains elements similar to those found in several of the others in combination.  Spirit women, of whom there are only a handful in the community, are women who can become possessed by the Holy Spirit at will.  Once they are possessed, the Holy Spirit helps them discover the whereabouts of lost objects or determine if the time is auspicious for their clients to undertake travels away from Urapmin territory.  Most importantly, the Spirit also helps a spirit woman to find out which particular nature spirit is making someone sick and to pray powerfully to God to remove the nature spirit from the sick person.
When clients visit a Spirit woman, she prays with them.  As she does so, she begins to shake and speak in tongues. This is called “‘working the Spirit”’ (wokim Spirit).  During this time, it is understood that the Holy Spirit is showing her pictures – showing her “‘videos’,” as some say who have seen this technology in a mining town four days’ walk to the South.  Normal people are sometimes “‘given”’ dreams (lumti) and visions (tiin begelmin) by the Spirit, but these rarely convey an unambiguous message that can serve as a basis for action.  The Spirit women, by contrast, are adept at interpreting their own tongues with reference to what they have been shown by the Spirit to produce messages that people can use in making plans for how to proceed.  Their relation to the Spirit is thus something like that of the person who hears the Spirit speak: they receive clear messages with real cognitive content.  There are differences, however.  Spirit women are very clear that they do not speak for themselves but rather that the Spirit speaks through them – there is no sense in which the Spirit helps them to know their own hearts more clearly.  The physical nature of their trance and their tongue speaking both similarly indicate some loss of self.  In return for this, the knowledge they are given is of things that usually only God can see, such as the doings of spirits, the placement of things that are hidden, and what will happen in the future.  Through their possession trances, then, Spirit women bring God, or at last God’s knowledge, down to earth in ways other people cannot.
The four kinds of relationships Urapmin experience with the Spirit differ in how they handle issues of mediation and distance.  When they are “‘working the Spirit’,” the Spirit women come the closest to full identity.  The very term used to refer to them -– “‘Spirit women”’ - attests to the extent of their identification with the Spirit, as do the loss of self they experience in trance and their disavowal of responsibility for what they say when they are possessed or when they are reporting on their possession experiences.  It is only in Spirit discos, when the Holy Spirit overcomes the will of the possessed dancers, that those who are not Spirit Women even come close to this kind of fusion with the Spirit.  This kind of identity occurs for those who are not Spirit women only in Spirit discos.  In Spirit discos, however, the identity of the person and the spiritcontact is evanescent and does not inject divine knowledge into profane social process.  The other kinds of contact with the Spirit I have discussed – the largely unrealized ideal of having the Spirit in one’s heart as a moral guide and the more common experience of having the Spirit speak in one’s heart – tend much less toward fusion.  They maintain a distance between people and the Spirit even as they put them in relationship with one another.  It is clear, then, that the Urapmin conceive of the mediating relation of the Holy Spirit in a range of ways.  As Samarin suggests, similarly complex sets of ideas mark Pentecostal thought on these matters in many cases around the world, hence the riot of “metaphors” he refers to.
  Why should there be so much complexity and play in Pentecostal’s’ religious ideas about mediation? 
	I would argue that complex models of the Spirit’s mediating role arise in Urapmin, and perhaps in Pentecostal communities more generally, is in order to forestall the potential eradication of the distance between the divine and the human worlds that possession can foster.  As in the Urapmin case, so too elsewhere, much of the variation in ideas about the Spirit serves to suggest ways the Spirit can bring the divine and the human into relations of contact that fall short of complete identity.  In this respect, ideas about and practices of connecting with the Holy Spirit become quite precise analogs of sacrifice in other religious systems: they bring the sacred and profane together and keep them apart at the same time.  The Urapmin have found a way to move from sacrifice to possession, then, without losing the ability, highly developed in their traditional religious system, to maintain some distance between themselves and their deities.
	The aptness of this interpretation of Urapmin notions of Holy Spirit possession as turning in important respects on issues of distance and mediation can be further demonstrated by concluding the ethnographic part of this article with a brief consideration of the most controversial aspect of the practice of the Spirit women.  The nature spirits I mentioned earlier – the motobil - make adults sick but they are unable to kill them; it is always sorcery (biit, tamon) that brings adult lives to an end.  But motobil are capable of killing children.  Sometimes, when a child is sick and has not responded to various attempts at Christian healing, including treatment by Spirit women, a Spirit woman who is treating the child will announce that the Holy Spirit has informed her that a pig should be sacrificed to the motobil who is holding the child.  These sacrifices are the only traditional ritual the Urapmin still practice, and they are very controversial among them.  But even as people worry that perhaps a Spirit woman who calls for one may be possessed by an evil spirit (sinik mafak) disguising itself as the Holy Spirit, they also quite regularly say that one “cannot talk behind the Holy Spirit’s back” and thus, on the chance that it is the Holy Spirit speaking, they do carry out the sacrifice (Robbins 2007).
	In contemporary Urapmin, these sacrifices are the strangest figures in the spiritual landscape.  In the context of the present argument about mediation and distance, two points about the way Urapmin come to practice them are crucial.  The first is that the sacrifices are called for precisely by those figures who come closest to completely collapsing the distance between people and the divine.  As noted above, the Holy Spirit’s possession of the Spirit women is the kind of possession that most closely identifies those who experience it with the Spirit.  And the fact that Spirit women can achieve this possession at will brings the Spirit into the round of daily life much more enduringly and predictably than do other forms of possession.  It is thus notable that it is Spirit women who, in the course of the kind of possession that most fully models identity, call for the traditional ritual that was most pointedly directed at creating distance – the kang anfukeleng sacrifices performed to encourage the motobil to let go of their victims.  More than the sacrifices to ancestors, which did aim to attract the ancestor’s support even while working to maintain their distance, kang anfukeleng is all about reestablishing distance, asking nothing more of the spirits than that they let go of their victim and go somewhere far away.  It is telling that the Spirit women find the need to reinforce the importance of this kind of distancing of the spirit world in the midst of the very ritual in which they display most vividly the possibilities the new Christian religion offers for collapsing in completely.
	The second relevant facet of the way a sacrifice comes about after a Spirit woman calls for it that is also relevant to issues of distance and mediation is the way people overcome their reluctance to carry out sacrifice by noting that “‘one cannot talk behind the Spirit’s back’.”  In the contexts in which it is uttered, this phrase is tantamount to saying that one should not doubt the sincerity of the Spirit woman’s report of what the Spirit has shown and told her.  It is, that is to say, a highly uncharacteristic call for people to trust the words that pass between people to be accurate reports of what the speaker meant, thus closing the distance between the speaker and the hearer.  The identity of the Spirit woman and the Holy Spirit is thus compounded by the identity, achieved through talk taken to be truthful and clear, of the Spirit woman and her audience.  It is both of these identities the sacrifice itself runs counter too, reminding those who undertake it that unmediated intimacy between people and the divine, and between people themselves, is a condition that harbors its own dangers.

Conclusion: Mediation, Distance, and the Demands of Social Life
	The issue that remains to be explored in conclusion is Wwhy does mediation between the sacred and profane among the Urapmin, or among any group of people, needs so carefully to guard so carefully against fusion?.  It is with this issue in mind in answer to this threat question that Hubert and Mauss take upell us that sacrifice is so well designed to forestall mediation, and therefore it holds at least one key to addressing the question I raised in the introduction: why do people bother positing spiritual worlds in terms that make them constant spurs to the consideration of issues not simply of divine presence, but of the nature and value of mediation between the sacred and the profane, and of the appropriate distance between them more generally? 	
	I began my introductory discussion of this question with Hubert and Mauss’s theory of sacrifice because issues of distance and mediation are so well developed within it.  I return again here to their essay to lay the groundwork for approachingtackle the question of why religious mediation needs to guard against complete fusion of the sacred and the profane. T We can recall that the key question  Hubert and Mauss (1964: 98-103) the related question of take up in their own conclusion is that of why an “intermediary” is necessary in sacrifice; why, that is, the sacrifier cannot simply approach the divine him- or herself but requires the mediation of the victim (Hubert and Mauss 1964: 98-103).  They offer several answers to this and related questions, all of which turn on the need to preserve the distance between the sacred and the profane.  “Thanks to the intermediary,” they reply, they note, the sacred and profane “can interpenetrate and yet remain distinct” (p. 99); they can “draw close to each other, without giving themselves to each other entirely” (p. 100).   Though sacrifice While sacrifice thus contains a moment of connectionmediation, it is ultimately, as de Heusch (1985: 10) emphasizes (though toward a different end than mine) as much about disjunction as conjunction (see also Willerslev 2009).  The mediator serves, as I have noted before, to keep the sacred and profane apart even as it facilitates their contact.
	As I pointed out in the introduction, Hubert and Mauss’ essay quite clearly works on two levels – it is both a study of a key type of religious ritual and a social tract.  In the conclusion in particular, it is always possible to read straight through their discussion of sacrificial ritual to get to the social points they are trying to make.  And it is on the level of theiris social argument that one can find their explanation of the necessity of keeping the sacred and profane separate from one another, a necessity sacrifice exemplifies. answer to the question of why mediation between the sacred and profane needs so carefully to guard against fusion.  
	In sacrifice, Hubert and Mauss (1964: 99) say, the sacrifier must use an intermediary and maintain a distance from the divine because without that distance he himself might become divine and then there would be no way for him to realize the benefits of the sacrifice in the profane sphere in which he/she had planned to enjoy them (Hubert and Mauss 1964: 99).  The image that haunts them here is one of fusion with the sacred that would constitute complete withdrawal from the profane world – the kind of withdrawal in which people cease completely to live their profane lives and to contribute to the maintenance of a viable social order.  Such withdrawal becomes an issue for some Pentecostal and Charismatic Christians in the guise of millennialism.​[8]​  The Urapmin regularly live with the problems such withdrawal raises, for they are given to falling into periods of millennial enthusiasm in which they set aside the concerns of daily life, spend most of their time in church, and often devote their nights to seeking fusion with the Holy Spirit in a constant round of Spirit discos undertaken in the hope that the entire community will be spiritually prepared when Jesus returns (Robbins 2004).  These periods of millennial enthusiasm always end when people begin to mention that old gardens need weeding and new ones need making, and a space for profane life slowly reasserts itself.  But the fact that these millennial periods occur at all indicates how difficult it can be, in the absence of sacrifice or some other technique of disjunctive mediation, to keep the sacred and the profane apart.
	This is where, I would suggest, we find a role for the Urapmin idea of the Holy Spirit as a mediator who possesses very few people in ways that force the identification of the sacred and profane.  For Urapmin, and perhaps for other Pentecostals and charismatics who face the threat that the possibility of unmediated contact with the divine poses to their profane social lives, this allows most of them a way to connect with God without bringing him too close.  It allows them to maintain a footing in this world even without resorting to sacrifice. 
	But along with raising the specter of social withdrawal, Hubert and Mauss also make another unabashedly social argument for the importance of maintaining some distance between the profane and the sacred.  In several important studies, Ivan Strenski (1998, 2002) has recovered In the French historical context of in which Hubert and Mauss developed their’s argument, .  He argues persuasively that they saw their work was an intervention in a politicized discussion of sacrifice that has historically marked French public life (Strenski 2002).  In particular, Hubert and Maussthey strongly rejected a Catholic model of total self-surrender that Ivan Strenski (2002: 162) calls “annihilationist” and that had long been dominant in France – a model in which one aims to give oneself completely for one’s kingdom or nation, even by dying if necessary.  For Hubert and Mauss, annihilationism represents is a dangerous misunderstanding of the real nature of sacrifice, rather than an example of one  legitimate way of thinking about itthis kind of rite.  At the same time, however, Hubert and Mauss also found problematic a strictly anti-sacrificial position that was prominent in French Protestant circles, one that promoted an individualist keeping to and for oneself with no thought for the needs of society, a view with some currency in the academic circles in which they traveled.  Against both of these counter-posed positions, they put forward a normative model in which sacrifice is necessary but is also less than total; one in which people “give of” the self to the social without “giving up” the self entirely (Strenski 2002: 170).  This is made clear in sacrificial ritual by the fact that people do not give up their whole selves in the course of the rite, but rather let only a part of themselves, or a representative of themselves, serve as an intermediary.  Such rituals, Hubert and Mauss imply, should serve as models for life lived in awareness both of what one owes to society and what one owes to oneself.
	The social stakes surrounding Urapmin negotiations over the proper shape of their ritual life are equally profound, though they are not precisely the recognizably modern liberal ones over which Hubert and Mauss struggled.  As I laid out in my discussion of traditional Urapmin understandings of sacrifice, secrecy, and the religious and social distribution of knowledge, the differentiation of people and of relationships and the creation of distance between people themselves have long been key Urapmin concerns.  Their understanding of difference and distance as fundamental to relationships is a variant of a more general and well known Melanesian tendency to assume that people are by nature composed of relations which they must innovate on and differentiate from in order to motivate the continual development of their selves and their social lives (for classic statements of this position, see Wagner 1981 and Strathern 1988, and for a more recent influential account see Stasch 2009, as well as footnote 4 above).  What is distinctive about the way the Urapmin and other Min groups construe these matters is their focus on knowledge, rather than only bodily substances, as one of the key exchangeable materials that can foster fused social identities unless it is treated in ways that lead to differentiation.  It is this emphasis that gives the Urapmin approach to issues of mediation and distance between people its distinctive shape.
	In light of these Urapmin concerns, we might say for them that the stakes over which the Urapminy struggle in their own debates about sacrifice, possession, and more general issues of mediation are ones that turn on how much people need to reveal of themselves in order to be in relationship.  Their traditional social life, in which the treachery of language was considered patent and in which sacrifice, secrecy, and the limited distribution of sacred and personal knowledge were highly valued, was one in which people were comfortable in their distance from one another and from their ancestors.  The exchange of gifts of food and other items, which I have not had space to discuss here, served to mediate enough information between people to keep relations running smoothly, but not so much as to make explicitly shared knowledge or the merging of social identities a possibility or a threat (Robbins 2007).  Christianity has pushed the Urapmin to move beyond this approach to social life into a world where possession can close the gap between the sacred and the profane and modern Christian norms of sincere speech ask them to reveal their hearts to one another every time they speak (see Keane 2007, Robbins 2001). I n Urapmin Christian understandings, rRelations between people , in Urapmin Christian understandings, should be made on the basis of clear and full communication, such that everyone knows what everyone else thinks and no one ever speaks less than sincerely – one should now, as a Christian, strive to give oneself completely in every social interaction – and fleeting images of the merging of the sacred and the profane in some kinds of Holy Spirit possession model the kind of merger such communication can create.  But the Urapmin complicate their understandings of possession such that even this rite does not reliably model the production of this fused state of social identification.  In a small community of 390 people, where one has to manage relations of some sort with almost everybody else, complete transparency and unmediated sharing of knowledge is not a tenable telos of social life(Besnier 2009).  Most likely, it is not tenable anywhere.  As Georg Simmel long ago told us:
Concord, harmony, coefficacy, which are unquestionably held to be socializing forces, must nevertheless be interspersed with distance, competition, repulsion, in order to yield the actual configuration of society…. although reciprocal knowledge conditions relationships positively, after all, it does not do this by itself alone.  Relationships being what they are, they also presuppose a certain ignorance and a measure of mutual concealment, even though this measure varies immensely, to be sure. (Simmel 1950:315-316).
In all of their play with different forms of mediation in their religious life, the problem of how to balance new Christian demands for intimacy and immediacy against old workable habits of distance-producing mediation are what the recently Christianized Urapmin are working out.
















1975.	Ritual and Knowledge among the Baktaman of New Guinea. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Barth, Fredrik.—
1987	Cosmologies in the Making: A Generative Approach to Cultural Variation in Inner New Guinea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Besnier, Niko. 2009. Gossip and the Everyday Production of Politics. Honolulu: University of Hawai’I Press.
de Heusch, Luc. 
1985. 	Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach. Translated by Linda. O’Brien and Alice. Morton, transl. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Durkheim, ÉEmile. 
1995. 	The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen. E. Fields, transl. New York: Free Press. First published in 1912.
Eisenlohr, Patrick. 
2012. “	Media and Religious Diversity.” Annual Review of Anthropology 41:37-55.
Engelke, Matthew. 
2007. 	A Problem of Presence: Beyond Scripture in an African Church. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Engelke, Matthew—. 
2011. “	Material Religion.” In Cambridge Companion to Religious Studies, Edited by. Robert. A. Orsi, ed. Pp. 209-229. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gardner, Donald. 
19811. 	Cult Ritual and Social Organization among the Mianmin.  Ph.D. Dissertation. Australian National University.
Gardner, Donald.S.. 
1987. “	Spirits and Conceptions of Agency among the Mianmin of Papua New Guinea.” Oceania 57(3):161-177.
Hubert, Henri, and Marcel Mauss. 
1964. 	Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function. Translated by W. D. Halls, transl. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. First published in 1898.
Jorgensen, Dan. 
1981. b	Taro and Arrows: Order, Entropy, and Religion among the Telefolmin. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of British Columbia.
Jorgensen, Dan. —
1990.	 “Secrecy’s Turns.” Canberra Anthropology 13(1):40-47.
Keane, Webb. 
2007. 	Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mauss, Marcel. 
1990.  [1925]	The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies. Translated by Jane I. GuyerW. D. Halls, transl.  Chicago: Hau Books.  Distributed by University of Chicago PressLondon: Routledge. First Published 1925.
Mayblin, Maya, and Magnus Course. 
2014. “	The Other Side of Sacrifice: Introduction.” Ethnos 79(3):307-319.
Meyer, Birgit. 1999. Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity among the Ewe of Ghana. Trenton: Africa World Press.
Meyer, Birgit. 
2006. “	Religious Revelation, Secrecy and the Limits of Visual Representation.” Anthropological Theory 6(4):431-453.
Meyer, Birgit.— 
2011 “	Mediation and Immediacy: Sensational Forms, Semiotic Ideologies and the Question of the Medium.” Social Anthropology 19(1):23-39.
Peters, John Durham. 
1999. 	Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Robbins, Joel. 
2001. “c	God is Nothing But Talk: Modernity, Language and Prayer in a Papua New Guinea Society.” American Anthropologist 103(4):901-912.
Robbins, Joel. —
2004. 	Becoming Sinners: Christianity and Moral Torment in a Papua New Guinea Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Robbins, Joel.— 
2007. “	You Can’t Talk Behind the Holy Spirit’s Back: Christianity and Changing Language Ideologies in a Papua New Guinea Society.” In Consequences of Contact: Language Ideologies and Sociocultural Transformations in Pacific Societies, edited by . Miki. Makihara and Bambi B.. B. Schieffelin,  eds. Pp. 125-139. New York: Oxford University Press.
Robbins, Joel.— 
2009. “	Conversion, Hierarchy, and Cultural Change: Value and Syncretism in the Globalization of Pentecostal and charismatic Christianity.” In Hierarchy: Persistence and Transformation in Social Formations, edited by . Knut. M. Rio and O. H. Smedal, eds. Pp. 65-88. New York: Berghahn.
—Robbins, Joel. 
2012. “	Some Things You Say, Some Things You Dissimulate, and Some Things You Keep to Yourself: Linguistic, Material and Marital Exchange in the Construction of Melanesian Societies.” In The Scope of Anthropology: Maurice Godelier’s Work in Context, edited by. Laurent. Dousset and Serge. Tcherkézoff, , eds. Pp. 25-45. New York: Berghahn.
Robbins, Joel and Alan Rumsey, Alan, and Joel Robbins, eds. 2008. ““Introduction: Cultural and Linguistic Anthropology and the Opacity of Other Minds” Anthropology and the Opacity of Other Minds.” Anthropological Quarterly 81(2): 407-420.
Samarin, William J. 
1972. 	Tongues of Men and Angels: The Religious Language of Pentecostalism. New York: Macmillan.
Schmidt, Leigh Eric. 
2002. 	Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and the American Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Simmel, Georg. 
1950. 	The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated by Kurt. H. Wolff, transl. New York: The Free Press.
Stasch, Rupert. 
2009. 	Society of Others: Kinship and Mourning in a West Papuan Place. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Strathern, Marilyn. 
1988. 	The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Strenski, Ivan. 
1998. “	Durkheim’s Bourgeois Theory of Sacrifice.” In On Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life, edited by . Nick. J. Allen, William. S. F. Pickering, and William . W. Miller,  eds. Pp. 116-126. London: Routledge.
Strenski, Ivan.— 
2002. 	Contesting Sacrifice: Religion, Nationalism, and Social Thought in France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stroumsa, Guy G. 
2009. 	The End of Sacrifice: Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wagner, Roy. 
1977. “	Analogic Kinship: A Daribi Example.” American Ethnologist 4(4):623-642.
Wagner, Roy. —
19811 (1975). 	The Invention of Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Willerslev, Rane. 






^1	  One direction in which the study of religious mediation has very productively gone is toward the study of the role of materiality in religion (see Engelke 2011 for a review).  This is not a major theme in my own argument here precisely because Hubert and Mauss (1964: 11-12) insist in their theory of sacrifice on the importance of the fact that the material mediator is always destroyed in the course of the rite, thus breaking the contact between the sacred and the profane that the sacrifice first establishes.  It would be interesting to look at the destruction of material mediators as a sub-theme in the study of material religion, but that is not a focus of the argument I develop here.
^2	  The ethnographic material presented in this article is drawn from 27 months of fieldwork in Urapmin carried out in the early 1990s.  The ethnographic present of this article refers to this period.  A little over a decade before I began my fieldwork, the Urapmin had abandoned almost all of their traditional ritual life.  The one major exception was their retention of sacrifice to nature spirits to cure some illnesses.  I discuss these sacrifices in detail later in the article.  My material on other aspects of traditional Urapmin religion, including the sacrifices to ancestors that were central to it, is thus based on extensive interviews with those Urapmin who had participated in these rituals before their conversion to Christianity.  This interview material accords with, and my own understanding of it is supplemented by, the very rich tradition of research on the traditional religion of the Min neighbors of the Urapmin that was carried out by anthropologists such as Fredrik Barth (1975, 1987), Don Gardner (1981, 1987), and Dan Jorgensen (1981, 1990) before Christian conversion became widespread in the region.
^3	  In this paper, terms in Tok Pisien, Papua New Guinea’s most widely spoken lingua franca and a language that is important to Urapmin Christianity, are underlined, while terms in the Urap language are given in italics.
^4	  In this paper, terms in Tok Pisin, Papua New Guinea’s most widely spoken lingua franca and a language that is important to Urapmin Christianity, are underlined, while terms in the Urap language are given in italics.
^5	  Making a similar point, the historian of religion Leigh Schmidt (2000: 6) has noted in his study of North American Christian approaches to the sense of hearing that “in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, divine absence, far more than presence, had to be constructed.”  
^6	  I have been extremely fortunate in the peer reviews of this paper.  One of the reviewers of this paper raised the important question of how the emphasis on difference and distance that I am claiming marked traditional Urapmin understandings of social relations squares with the value I have elsewhere claimed the Urapmin place on making and maintaining such relations (e.g. Robbins 2004).  Another of the reviewers indirectly provided an answer to this question when they quite brilliantly tied the overall argument of this article to that of Roy Wagner’s (1977) classic piece “Analogic Kinship.”  In that article, Wagner argues that Melanesians, and perhaps others as well, sometimes imagine worlds in which the relations between people, and hence people themselves, are all the same.  In order to create society, people work against this analogic similarity between people and relations to differentiate various kinds of people and relations through practices such as exchange and avoidance.  One way to read Wagner’s article in terms of the argument I am developing here is to note that he is claiming that without difference and distance, there can be no relations.  Therefore, people like the Urapmin who value relationships will work assiduously to create and maintain such difference and distance precisely so that they can use it as both the provocation and the raw material for the creation of relationships (see also Stasch 2009).  Although I had not recognized this point before the reviewer mentioned Wagner’s article, I realize now that Wagner’s argument is very much in the background of the one I am developing here, as will become even more evident in the conclusion.  
^7	  Mayblin and Course (2014) show that the discuss the complexity of the Christian demand to give up on sacrifice is complex from an anthropological point of view, since themes of sacrifice often pervade Christian discourse and symbolism even when the practice of sacrifice has been discontinued, and Stroumsa (2009), who locates the original abandonment of sacrifice in Judaism, from which he claims Christianity inherits it, places the end of sacrifice at the center of what he sees as wide ranging changes in the nature of religion during late antiquity.  While both of these works stress the complexity of Christian claims to have abandoned the overcoming of sacrifice, – and in particular the way sacrificial themes and imagery remain central to Christianity - the Urapmin fit the general pattern they lay out well in that they understand Christianity as prohibiting the actual practice of blood sacrifice.
^8	  Millennialism is not, in fact, the only guise in which withdrawal becomes an issue for Pentecostals.  One could analyze their tendencies toward extreme asceticism and political quietism in similar ways.  Here, however, I will focus on millennialism, which is the most dramatic case.
